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Abstract
& In this event-related brain potentials (ERPs) study, we ex-
plored the possibility to selectively track referential ambiguity
during spoken discourse comprehension. Earlier ERP research
has shown that referentially ambiguous nouns (e.g., ‘‘the girl’’
in a two-girl context) elicit a frontal, sustained negative shift
relative to unambiguous control words. In the current study,
we examined whether this ERP effect reflects ‘‘deep’’ situation
model ambiguity or ‘‘superficial’’ textbase ambiguity. We con-
trasted these different interpretations by investigating whether a
discourse-level semantic manipulation that prevents referential
ambiguity also averts the elicitation of a referentially induced
ERP effect. We compared ERPs elicited by nouns that were ref-
erentially nonambiguous but were associated with two dis-
course entities (e.g., ‘‘the girl’’ with two girls introduced in the
context, but one of which has died or left the scene), with
referentially ambiguous and nonambiguous control words. Al-
though temporally referentially ambiguous nouns elicited a
frontal negative shift compared to control words, the ‘‘double
bound’’ but referentially nonambiguous nouns did not. These
results suggest that it is possible to selectively track referential
ambiguity with ERPs at the level that is most relevant to dis-
course comprehension, the situation model. &
INTRODUCTION
As there is only a limited number of different names
around, some people probably recognize the following
situation: You and a friend have two acquaintances with
the same forename (e.g., ‘‘John’’). At some point, your
friend tells you that he saw ‘‘John’’ the other day. But
you don’t know which ‘‘John’’ your friend is actually
talking about, and you will have to ask for further
specification. Until further notice, ‘‘John’’ remains ref-
erentially ambiguous.
Of course, referential ambiguity is not restricted to
proper names, but arises whenever a reader or listener is
unable to select a single referent for a name, pronoun,
or noun phrase (NP) out of multiple candidates. For
example, ‘‘the girl’’ is also referentially ambiguous when
embedded in a two-girl story context that does not allow
you to make a fair choice. This ambiguity illustrates that
to get at the fullest meaning possible, one must establish
both the meaning of a word (sense or semantic analy-
sis) and its reference to a certain entity (referential
analysis or anaphoric processing).
Establishing reference is of particular importance dur-
ing discourse comprehension or dialogue. As conversa-
tions and stories unfold, entities are referred to over and
over again. If we were unable to establish reference for
repeated referring expressions, our understanding of dis-
course would be next to nothing. For this reason, re-
searchers studying discourse comprehension have spent
a great deal of attention on referential processing (see
Graesser, Zwaan, & Millis, 1997, for a review), mainly with
behavioral measures such as self-paced reading or cross-
modal probing. However, unlike other linguistic sub-
processes such as syntax and semantics, referential
processing has received relatively little attention from
researchers who study sentence or discourse comprehen-
sion with event-related brain potentials (ERPs).
Researchers have used ERPs for decades now to track
the temporal dynamics of different linguistic subpro-
cesses without a confounding task (that may induce
task-specific strategies), and the multidimensional char-
acteristics of ERPs can provide cues to the identity of
the cognitive event at hand (Van Berkum, 2004). For
example, a number of ERP components have been
identified as to distinctively tap into syntactic or se-
mantic aspects of language comprehension, and have
subsequently been exploited to study syntactic and se-
mantic analysis in different linguistic environments (see
Brown, Hagoort, & Kutas, 2000, for a review). But until
recently, no one had looked for a distinct ERP signature
of referential analysis in language comprehension.
Evidence that the brain responds in qualitatively differ-
ent ways to problems with reference than to problems
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with either syntax or semantics came from a recent series
of ERP studies by Van Berkum, Brown, and Hagoort
(1999) and Van Berkum, Zwitserlood, Hagoort, and
Brown (2003). Although semantic and syntactic process-
ing are predominantly associated with the N400 and P600/
(E)LAN, respectively (e.g., Friederici, 2002; Hagoort,
Brown, & Osterhout, 1999), referentially ambiguous
nouns (e.g., ‘‘the girl’’ in a two-girl context) and refer-
entially ambiguous pronouns (e.g., ‘‘David noticed John
when he stood up.’’) elicit a frontally dominant and
sustained negative shift (Van Berkum, Zwitserlood,
Bastiaansen, Brown, & Hagoort, 2004; Van Berkum
et al., 1999, 2003; see Van Berkum, Koornneef, Otten, &
Nieuwland, in press, for a review).
In the current study, we further examined the utility
of this ERP signature as a tool to selectively track refer-
ential ambiguity during discourse comprehension. The
rationale for this study is that the referentially induced
ERP effect reported by Van Berkum and colleagues may
be taken to reflect ambiguity on two different levels
of language processing. First, it may reflect ‘‘deep’’
situation model ambiguity from having two referential
candidates for a single anaphor. Alternatively, it may
reflect a more ‘‘superficial’’ ambiguity at the level of
memory for text (‘‘textbase’’; e.g., Kintsch, 1998) that
arises because a single lexical concept (‘‘the girl’’) has
been featured twice to denote two different entities in
the discourse.
In the former case, this referentially induced ERP can
actually inform us about the waxing and waning of ref-
erential accessibility, that is, the changes in focus on
story characters that accompany their comings and
goings. For instance, although readers and listeners have
a default focus on story protagonists (e.g., Zwaan &
Radvansky, 1998), the accessibility of secondary charac-
ters (or objects) is partly dependent on whether they
are part of the same scenario as the protagonist (e.g.,
Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987). If they are, their
accessibility will be greater, perhaps reflecting the need
to keep them readily available as a future referent (see
also Horton & Rapp, 2003, for an account in terms of
perceptual perspective of story protagonists). Given that
readers construct and continuously update a mental
model that allows focused characters to be more easily
accessed, they can, in principle, also use this model to
avoid referential ambiguity. For example, when two girls
were originally mentioned in a story, but one girl has
passed away early in the story (and is therefore out of
focus), ‘‘girl’’ in ‘‘when they met a year later, he told the
girl’’ is not referentially ambiguous. Pursuing this logic,
if the frontal negative shift reported by Van Berkum
et al. (1999, 2003) reflects situation model referential
ambiguity, it should also prove to be sensitive to this
waxing and waning of referential accessibility.
In contrast, the ERP effect reported by Van Berkum
et al. may also reflect a more superficial, low-level am-
biguity. Such an account might go along the lines of
what are called bottom-up, memory-based accounts of
text processing (e.g., Kintsch, 1998; Myers & O’Brien,
1998). According to such accounts, a referring expres-
sion will automatically activate all antecedents that share
features in common with that anaphor (e.g., when differ-
ent entities are referred to by the same lexical concept),
be it by a process of spreading activation (e.g., Kintsch,
1998) or resonance (e.g., Myers & O’Brien, 1998). As a
consequence, these antecedents will initially be returned
to working memory, independent of whether this will
ultimately facilitate further processing, and irrespective
of whether they are suitable candidates. Although it
would be interesting if the ERP effect reported by Van
Berkum et al. reflects such a ‘‘superficial’’ ambiguity,
this effect then could not inform us on how readers and
listeners ultimately establish reference during discourse
comprehension.
In short, the abovementioned competing accounts
illustrate that the functional significance of this ERP ef-
fect still needs to be established. Whether it can actually
be used to selectively track discourse-level referential
processing hinges on whether it is sensitive to discourse-
level changes in referential accessibility of story charac-
ters. In the experiment reported below, we addressed
this issue by examining whether the elicitation of
this ‘‘referentially induced’’ ERP effect is averted by a
discourse-level semantic manipulation that prevents ref-
erential ambiguity.
Subjects listened to short stories describing a protag-
onist and two secondary characters engaged in conver-
sation. Three story types were created by manipulating
the denotation of the secondary characters and/or the
story content (see Table 1), but every story contained
two NPs that referred to one of the secondary characters
(the precritical and critical NP, respectively). In the 1–1
referent condition, both the precritical and critical NPs
had only one possible referent, hence, were referentially
unambiguous. In the 2–2 referent condition, both NPs
had two possible referents, hence, were referentially
ambiguous. But in the 2–1 referent condition, the pre-
critical NP was referentially ambiguous, whereas the crit-
ical NP was referentially unambiguous.
We measured ERP responses to precritical and critical
NPs. In the 2–2 referent condition, both ambiguous NPs
should elicit a frontal, sustained negative shift (as re-
ported by Van Berkum et al., 1999, 2003) relative to the
corresponding NPs in the 1–1 referent condition. The
precritical NP in the 2–1 referent condition was also
referentially ambiguous, and should thus also elicit this
ERP effect. Our crucial comparison, however, was at the
critical NP in the 2–1 referent condition (when one sec-
ondary character had already left the scene). If this un-
ambiguous NP still elicits a frontal negative shift, the ERP
effect reported by Van Berkum et al. can be taken to
reflect superficial, ‘‘textbase’’ ambiguity. Alternatively,
if the unambiguous NP does not elicit a frontal negative
shift but an ERP that resembles the 1–1 referent condition
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instead, the referentially induced ERP can be taken to
reflect ‘‘deep’’ discourse-level referential ambiguity.
METHODS
Thirty-one right-handed, healthy college students (14 men,
mean age = 21.8 years, native speakers of Dutch)
listened to 90 naturally spoken Dutch stories. Each story
consisted of five sentences and contained one protago-
nist and two secondary characters. The protagonist was
always denoted with either a proper name (e.g., ‘‘Jim’’)
or a simple definite NP (e.g., ‘‘the police-officer’’). The
two secondary characters were always denoted with an
NP followed by a relative clause of at least four words
(e.g., ‘‘the nephew who was into history’’). In the 1–1
referent condition, the secondary characters were de-
noted with different NPs (e.g., one uncle who. . . and
one nephew who. . .). In the 2–2 and 2–1 referent
condition, identical NPs were implied by using the sub-
stitution ‘‘another’’ to circumvent any differential effect
of lexical repetition of the critical NPs across conditions.
The subsequent relative clauses consisted of at least
three words and differed only in the final word (e.g.,
‘‘who was into history’’ and ‘‘who was into politics’’).
The first sentence of each story introduced all three
characters. The second sentence always made explicit
reference only to the protagonist. The third sentence
described the actions of both the secondary characters:
In the 1–1 and 2–1 referent condition, one secondary
character left the scene (e.g., ‘‘died’’ or ‘‘left the room’’).
In the 2–2 referent condition, both characters stayed
in the current scene. The fourth sentence was used to
again foreground the protagonist. The fifth sentence
was identical across conditions and followed the tem-
plate hprotagonisti hmatrix-verbi hsecondary characteri
hremainderi. This final sentence involved a secondary
character that was still present in the scene. Whether this
secondary character was first-mentioned in either Sen-
tence 1 or 3 was balanced over the set of stories. To justify
the use of the complete relative clause in the final sen-
tence, the theme of the final sentence was always closely
related to the content of the relative clause (e.g., follow-
ing ‘‘who was into politics. . .,’’ the remainder of the
sentence would subsequently describe political affairs).
Three different versions of each story were recorded
by the same female speaker with a normal speaking rate
and intonation. To control for systematical, prosodic dif-
ferences between referentially ambiguous and nonam-
biguous speech segments, we had 20 different subjects
participate in a forced-choice decision task. After sub-
jects were fully informed about possible prosodic differ-
ences in case of referential ambiguity, their task was to
classify all speech segments (truncated before the dis-
ambiguating word, e.g., ‘‘the nephew who was into’’) as
taken from a sentence in which this segment was ref-
erentially ambiguous or not. The results from this pre-
test showed that they were not able to classify segments
above chance level.
Three trial lists were used for the ERP experiment. For
the first list, 30 stories of each condition were pseudo-
randomly mixed with 60 filler stories (materials from
Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2006b, Experiment 1), such
that neither condition occurred more than two times
consecutively, whereas trials of each type were matched
on average list position. The other two lists were derived
from the first by rotating the different trial types. The
total of 150 stories was divided in 10 blocks, separated
by a pause. Each trial was separated from the next by a
5-sec silence and was preceded by a short warning tone.
Total time-on-task was approximately 80 min. Partici-
pants were seated in front of two loudspeakers and were
informed that they would be listening to short stories.
They were instructed to listen for comprehension and
minimize movement. No additional task demands were
imposed.
Table 1. Example Story (Approximate Translation from
Dutch)
1–1 Referent
At the family get-together, Jim had been talking to his
nephew who was very much into politics and his uncle
who was really into history. But Jim himself was only
interested in sports, cars, girls etc. The uncle who was
into history left early, but the nephew who was into
politics kept rambling on. Jim didn’t understand one bit
and got rather bored. He told the nephew who was into
politics that politicians should not systematically neglect
delightful and important subjects like sports and girls.
2–2 Referent
At the family get-together, Jim had been talking to one
nephew who was very much into politics and another
one who was really into history. But Jim himself was only
interested in sports, cars, girls etc. The nephew who was
into history kept telling boring stories, and the other one
also kept rambling on. Jim didn’t understand one bit and
got rather bored. He told the nephew who was into
politics that politicians should not systematically neglect
delightful and important subjects like sports and girls.
2–1 Referent
At the family get-together, Jim had been talking to one
nephew who was very much into politics and another
one who was really into history. But Jim himself was only
interested in sports, cars, girls etc. The nephew who
was into history left early, but the nephew who was into
politics kept rambling on. Jim didn’t understand one bit
and got rather bored. He told the nephew who was into
politics that politicians should not systematically neglect
delightful and important subjects like sports and girls.
Precritical and critical NPs are printed in boldface, and the crucial event
in the 2–1 referent condition is printed in italics.
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The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from
30 standard scalp locations, amplified (band-pass filtered
at 0.03–100 Hz), digitized at 500 Hz, and re-referenced
to the mean of left and right mastoids. Ocular and
muscular artifacts were corrected by means of a proce-
dure based on Independent Component Analysis
(e.g., Makeig, Jung, Ghahremani, Bell, & Sejnowski,
1997). Then, epochs that ranged from 500 msec to
+2000 msec relative to critical word onset were ex-
tracted and normalized (by subtraction) to a 150-msec
preonset baseline. Subsequently, segments with poten-
tials exceeding ±75 AV were rejected, and the remainder
was screened for drift artifacts. If the total rejection rate
exceeded 40%, data of the participant were excluded. Six
participants were excluded, leaving an average segment
loss of 18% across the remaining 25 participants.
RESULTS
As shown in Figure 1, the referentially ambiguous, pre-
critical NPs from both the 2–2 and 2–1 referent con-
dition elicited a sustained, frontal negative shift relative
to unambiguous NPs in the 1–1 referent condition. The
corresponding difference waveforms and their scalp dis-
tributions are displayed in Figure 2. These results are
very comparable to, and thus, replicate the findings by
Van Berkum et al. (2003).
The results from our crucial comparison are displayed
in Figure 3. The critical NPs in the 2–2 referent condition
again elicited a frontal negative shift relative to critical
NPs in the 1–1 referent condition, which had a distribu-
tion similar to the effect elicited by precritical NPs.
However, this effect did not reappear in the 2–1 referent
condition where one character had left the scene. The
corresponding difference waveforms and their scalp
distributions are displayed in Figure 4. These results sug-
gest that a discourse-level semantic manipulation that
prevents referential ambiguity also averts the elicitation
of the ERP effect reported by Van Berkum et al. (1999,
2003, 2004).
The effects of referential ambiguity at the precritical
NPs in the 2–2 and 2–1 referent conditions and at
the critical NPs in the 2–2 referent condition were
Figure 1. Grand averages
elicited by precritical NPs.
In this and all the following
figures, negativity is plotted
upward and waveforms are
filtered (5 Hz high cutoff,
48 dB/oct) for presentation
purpose only.
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statistically significant using mean amplitude in the 500–
1500 msec window at anterior channels, but not at pos-
terior channels. Because these ambiguity effects were
benchmarks for interpreting the comparison at the crit-
ical NP in the 2–1 referent condition, and we wanted
to have maximal power in the statistical tests involving
this critical effect, we used only anterior channels for
further analysis.
Figure 2. Difference waves
at Fz for precritical NPs
(2–2 minus 1–1 referent
condition, and 2–1 minus
1–1 referent condition),
and corresponding scalp
distributions for the time
windows that were used for
statistical analysis.
Figure 3. Grand averages
elicited by critical NPs.
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Using mean amplitude in five consecutive latency win-
dows (100–300, 300–600, 600–1000, 1000–1500, 1500–
2000 msec from word onset), the overall 2 (condition) 
15 (electrode) analysis of variance revealed significant
main effects of referential ambiguity for precritical NPs in
the 2–2 referent condition (600–1000 and 1000–1500 msec
windows) and precritical NPs in the 2–1 referent condi-
tion (300–600, 600–1000, 1000–1500, and 1500–2000 msec
windows; see Table 2).
An identical analysis for the ERPs elicited by the crit-
ical NPs revealed significant main effects of referential
ambiguity for the 2–2 referent condition in the 100–300,
300–600, 600–1000, and 1000–1500 msec windows. Cru-
cially, the 2–1 referent condition did not significantly
differ from the 1–1 referent condition in any of the time
windows. Subsequent comparison of the ERPs elicited
by critical NPs in the 2–2 and 2–1 referent conditions
revealed significant main effects of ambiguity in the 300–
600 msec [F(1,24) = 6.65, p = .016], 600–1000 msec
[F(1,24) = 10.66, p = .003], and 1000–1500 msec
[F(1,24) = 25.11, p = .000] windows.
Finally, we analyzed ERPs elicited by referentially dis-
ambiguating words (e.g., ‘‘politics’’ and ‘‘history’’) follow-
ing precritical and critical NPs (displayed in Figure 5).
There were no significant differences between the 1–1
referent condition and the other two conditions in any
time window (at either anterior of posterior channels),
except for the 1000–1500 msec window following precrit-
ical NPs. In this time window, the 2–2 referent condition
significantly differed from the 1–1 condition [F(1,24) =
5.83, p = .031] and almost significantly differed from the
2–1 condition [F(1,24) = 5.12, p = .064]. These differ-
ences are perhaps caused by differences in story content
that occur after these disambiguating words: The infor-
mation that both characters stay in the current scene (in
the 2–2 referent condition) may be more salient or un-
expected than one character leaving the scene.
Importantly, the referentially induced ERP effect per-
sisted after participants had heard the disambiguating
words (the mean distance between NPs and disambigu-
ating words was 1083 msec, min = 673, max = 1139).
Together with the absence of any immediate effect of
disambiguating words, this suggests that although the
Figure 4. Difference waves
for critical NPs.
Table 2. F Values and p Values for Main Effects of
Referential Ambiguity in Five Consecutive Time Windows
(at Anterior Channels Only)
Latency Range from Acoustic Word Onset (msec)
100–300 300–600 600–1000 1000–1500 1500–2000
Precritical NPs
2–2 referent condition
F 0.47 1.28 14.00 17.41 2.94
p .50 .269 .001*** .000**** .099
2–1 referent condition
F 0.80 7.56 18.20 12.86 7.06
p .38 .01* .000**** .001*** .014*
Critical NPs
2–2 referent condition
F 5.58 4.55 4.61 8.34 0.33
p .03* .04* .042* .008** .57
2–1 referent condition
F 0.96 0.02 0.45 1.16 0.86
p .34 .97 .51 .292 .36
For all F tests, numerator df = 1, denominator df = 24.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .005, ****p < .001.
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referentially induced ERP effect is immediately triggered
by referentially ambiguous words, it ultimately outlasts
the resolution of this ambiguity.
DISCUSSION
Our ERP findings confirm earlier evidence for rapid refer-
ential analysis in discourse comprehension (Van Berkum
et al., 1999, 2003; see Tanenhaus, Spivey Knowlton,
Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995, for comparable results from
visual world eye-tracking experiments) and are consist-
ent with delays observed in the reading of referen-
tially ambiguous nouns (e.g., Garnham, 2001; Myers &
O’Brien, 1998). More importantly, our results suggest that
the frontal, sustained negative shift reported by Van
Berkum et al. (1999, 2003) reflects genuine referential
ambiguity from having two eligible referents in the cur-
rent model of the discourse, and not superficial ambiguity
from two entities having been mentioned in the dis-
course. As such, it has proven sensitive to changes
in referential accessibility that typically accompany the
comings and goings of story characters, and can thus be
brought into action as a tool to selectively track referential
processing during discourse comprehension.
Upon encountering a referentially ambiguous word,
a listener is temporally unable to construct a coherent
mental model of what is described in the discourse, and
has to take into account that both eligible candidates may
Figure 5. ERPs elicited
by disambiguating words
following precritical (left)
and critical (right) NPs at
midline electrodes.
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turn out to be the intended referent. Note that these
candidates do not need to be semantically equivalent
(e.g., ‘‘two girls’’), as a similar ERP effect is also elicited by
lexically ambiguous words that can refer to equally likely,
though semantically different entities (e.g., ‘‘a pitcher’’ in
‘‘The pitcher fell down. . .’’; Hagoort & Brown, 1994). In
this latter case, one could argue that lexically ambiguous
words (when presented in a sufficiently neutral context)
force the reader to set up two competing referents. But
whether the referential candidates are semantically equiv-
alent or not, referential ambiguity may very well demand
additional working memory resources, which may explain
why the referentially induced ERP effect resembles ERP
effects that are associated with increased working mem-
ory load in linguistic (e.g., Kutas, 1997) as well as nonlin-
guistic tasks (e.g., Donaldson & Rugg, 1999), and why it is
correlated with reading span performance (Nieuwland &
Van Berkum, 2006a).
Potential cues to the functional neuroanatomical un-
derpinnings of the referentially induced ERP effect come
from a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging
study by Rodd, Davis, and Johnsrude (2005). In their
study, subjects were presented lexically ambiguous words
in relatively neutral sentence contexts (e.g., ‘‘He saw the
hair/hare. . .’’), thus comparable to the materials known
to evoke sustained, frontal negative shifts in the ERP
(Hagoort & Brown, 1994). These ambiguous sentences
were found to increase activity in temporal and frontal
brain regions, including the left inferior frontal gyrus
(LIFG) and, to some extent, its right hemisphere counter-
part. In recent years, the LIFG has been associated with a
range of processes, and there is still discussion about
its functional subdivision. However, there seems to be a
growing consensus that at least the anterior part of
the LIFG (BA 45/47) is involved in making compari-
sons of semantic representations held in working mem-
ory during linguistic and nonlinguistic processing (e.g.,
Bookheimer, 2002; Kaan & Swaab, 2002; Wagner, Pare-
Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001; Thompson-Schill,
D’Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997), or, as Novick,
Trueswell, and Thompson-Schill (2005) put it, detecting
and resolving conflict when multiple characterizations of
the linguistic or nonlinguistic input point toward incom-
patible interpretations. It thus seems reasonable to pre-
dict that the LIFG (or, more specifically, at least BA 45/47)
is also involved in processing referential ambiguity. We
are currently undertaking a functional neuroimaging
study to test this prediction and to explore which areas
of the human brain are differentially involved in dealing
with referential ambiguity, referential failure (when no
referential candidate is directly available at all), and se-
mantic incongruity during language comprehension.
Although the present findings show that ERPs can be
used to selectively track referential analysis in discourse
comprehension, our results also raise new questions
with regard to the resolution of referential ambiguity.
The referentially induced ERP effect proved sensitive to
discourse-level semantic information, but did not imme-
diately disappear upon encountering a disambiguating
word. These seemingly paradoxical results indicate that
the increased working memory load due to referential
ambiguity has relatively long-lasting effects on language
processing (see also Kutas, 1997, for similar results using
syntactic complexity manipulations). In other words, our
findings may suggest that although making a demand
on processing capacity has an immediate effect, letting
go of this demand is a more gradual process. Further
research is needed to clarify these issues.
One other caveat that should be made here is that
the elicitation of a frontal negative shift by a referentially
problematic word may be restricted to referentially am-
biguous words. That is to say, this ERP effect is not the
sole ‘‘representative’’ of referential problems in general.
ERP studies investigating other referential aspects of lan-
guage comprehension (e.g., Nieuwland & Van Berkum,
2006a; Van Berkum et al., 2004, in press; Anderson &
Holcomb, 2005; Swaab, Camblin, & Gordon, 2004; Harris,
Wexler, & Holcomb, 2000; Streb, Rosler, & Hennighausen,
1999; Osterhout & Mobley, 1995) suggest that different
referential ‘‘problems’’ (e.g., nonparallel discourse struc-
tures, referential failure, synonymy) may elicit ERP effects
that are typically associated with semantic or syntactic
problems (e.g., N400 or P600). Perhaps because establish-
ing reference is intricately intertwined with phonological,
syntactic, and semantic levels of linguistic representation,
referential problems may sometimes affect the analysis
at other levels and become manifest as such (see Van
Berkum et al., in press, for a discussion).
In all, our results show that the ERP effect that is
associated with referential ambiguity reflects genuine
ambiguity from having two eligible candidates in the
situation model of the discourse. This suggests that
at least one type of problem with referential analysis,
namely, referential ambiguity, can be selectively tracked
with ERPs at the level that is most relevant to discourse
comprehension, the situation model.
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